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The United States Unemployment Insurance Program (UI), 
was set up to provide a safety net for workers who lose 
their jobs through no fault of their own. It is authorized by 
federal statute, implemented and administered at the 
state level, and financed by both. States may each set their 
own qualifying requirements, benefit amounts, and 
duration times. These differing layers of federal and state 
regulation (and lack of consistent regulation) make for a 
very complex system where mistakes are inevitable.  
The US Department of Labor 
(DOL), which has been moni-
toring  improper payments 
since at least the 1980s, esti-
mates that in 2013, the UI 
program covered 131 million 
workers, paid $74.4 billion in 
benefits, and spent $4.8 bil-
lion on administrative costs.1 
With so much public money 
and so many workers’ inter-
ests involved, the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program and 
its payment errors are wor-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Government payment programs 
make a lot of errors that cost 
taxpayers money. 
 
Information technology and 
communication innovations at 
the Department of Labor have 
lowered the error rate for the 
Unemployment Insurance 
Program. 
 
Using federal funds to finance 
state-level innovations saved 
money.  
 
Other payment programs could 
benefit from similar strategies. 
2 thy of a closer look. According to data pro-
vided by the DOL’s Benefit Accuracy Meas-
urement (BAM) program, of 193,132 audit-
ed claims made during a ten-year period 
2002-2011, 25.73% contained payment er-
rors (49,698 errors). Overpayments out-
number underpayments nearly 4 to 1.  
EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENT ERRORS 
The federal government began focusing on 
improper payments throughout the federal 
government in the early 2000s. In 2002, 
congress passed the Improper Payment In-
formation Act, which signaled the federal 
government’s intention to take improper 
payments seriously. This legislation was fol-
lowed by Executive Order 13520 issued by 
President Obama that required federal agen-
cies to develop a more structured approach 
to eliminate payment errors, waste, fraud, 
and abuse in major federal programs. Con-
gress again took action in 2010 passing the 
Improper Payment Elimination and Recov-
ery Act. This act set a 10% error rate bench-
mark for any program to be in compliance 
with the statute. 
Although the UI program error rate had fall-
en from prior levels, it was above 10% in 
2011, leaving the UI system out of compli-
ance.  In response to these conditions and in 
an effort to reign in the rise of improper pay-
ments, the assistant secretary of the Em-
ployment and Training Administration at 
the DOL issued a program letter identifying 
the following four root causes of improper 
payments in UI:2  
1) payments made to individuals after they 
have returned to work, referred to as 
Benefit Year Earnings 
2) payments paid improperly as result of 
untimely or incomplete job separation 
information 
3) payments paid improperly as a result of 
states’ inability to validate that the 
claimant had met the state’s work search 
requirements, and 
4) payments paid improperly as the claim-
ant had failed to register with the state’s 
Employment Services. 
After publication of the UI program letter, 
the DOL began offering supplemental fund-
ing to state workforce agencies (SWAs) to 
implement several top-down strategies de-
signed to lower improper payments. The 
strategies involved information technology 
(IT) solutions that cross-referenced employ-
ment data from several national and state 
databases. Another tactic focused on im-
proving communication between SWAs, cor-
porations, and claimants. The funded strate-
gies included: 
1) Widespread adoption of the State Data 
Exchange System (SIDES) which allows 
UI agents to quickly and accurately 
check claimants’ separation data directly 
with employers. This is important be-
cause the UI program only pays benefits 
for specific causes of job separation. 
2) Mandatory cross matching between 
State and National Directories of New 
Hires (SDNH/NDNH) to combat the un-
derreporting of earnings by claimants 
while they are collecting benefits.  
3) Increased communication (messaging) 
between SWAs, corporations, and claim-
ants to improve claimants’ and employ-
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ers’ awareness of their responsibilities for 
data reporting and claimants’ work search 
requirements.  
Our research focused on the UI payment data 
from 2004-2013, a few years before and after 
the 2011 UI program letter. We took a close 
look at the improper payment rates in each 
state compared to when pieces of the strate-
gic plan were implemented.  
There are any number of external factors that 
influence improper payments (such as state 
population, unemployment rate, gross state 
product, UI administrative costs, and the 
Great Recession) making it difficult to gauge 
the effect of the DOL’s improvement efforts.  
So, we combined the BAM data with other 
state-level data and used regression analysis 
to control for other influences and isolate the 
effects of the UI error-reducing strategies.3  
RESULTS 
As figure 1 shows, in 2011 the rate of improp-
er payments did begin to decrease. However, 
as the bars on the graph show, there was wide 
variation in the state rates. Our calculations 
showed that the SDNH/NDNH and messag-
ing strategies had a statistically significant 
positive effect in lowering both the state im-
proper payment rates and the amount of 
total dollars overpaid per capita for states 
that had completed the strategies. We found 
no evidence that implementing the SIDES 
strategy had a systematic impact on errors. 
While the data show that these strategies 
have helped lower improper payments, 
there is still room for improvement. In 2013, 
the UI program improper payment rate had 
decreased to 9.3% (under 10%), but that 
still amounted to a total of $6.2 billion in im-
proper payments.4 And, newer data show 
the error rate has crept back up to 11.7%.5  
WHAT’S NEXT? 
While there are always competing trade-offs 
between timeliness, cost, and complete ac-
curacy, technological innovations and in-
creased communication targeted at recog-
nized sources of error provide a means in 
which UI agents can continue to decrease 
improper payments.  
Further scrutiny and effort is needed not 
only on Unemployment Insurance, but also 
on other government payment programs 
with high error rates such as Medicare, Med-
icaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit as 
shown in figure 2. 
No one-size-fits-all strategy is likely to work 
for all programs, but it seems clear that data 
collection and reporting, political support, 
administrative innovations, supportive 
funding, and strategic use of data technology 
tools are all crucial components in success-
ful efforts to reduce improper payments 
Figure 1: State UI Improper Payment Rates 
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within government programs. Furthermore, 
IT tools that directly target the leading causes 
of improper payments and those which do not 
require a behavior change on behalf of the 
claimants or employers are more likely to be 
successful. Additionally, communication strat-
egies that broadly lower the costs to commu-
nication among the relevant stakeholders also 
show promise in lowering the incidence of 
improper payments.  
IT tools that directly target 
the leading causes of 
improper payments … are 
more likely to be successful 
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Notes: 
1 Department of Labor, 2013  
2 Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 19-11. 
3 For more on methodology see Greer, R. & Bullock, J. 
(2017). Decreasing improper payments in state unem-
ployment insurance: Evaluating Department of Labor 
strategies. Public Administration Review, forthcoming. 
4 Calculated by the authors from the BAM data. Includes 
the absolute values of both over and under payments. 
5 https://paymentaccuracy.gov/high-priority-programs/ 
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To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
http://bit.ly/1ABajdH  
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Figure 2: Current Improper Payment Rates 
for some Government Payment Programs  
Source: PaymentAccuracy.gov High Priority Programs 
https://paymentaccuracy.gov/high-priority-
programs/ (accessed 8/30/2017). 
